Building biosecurity for synthetic biology

Benjamin D. Trump; S. E. Galaitsi; Evan Appleton; Diederik A. Bleijs; Marie Valentine Florin; Jimmy D. Gollihar; R. Alexander Hamilton; Todd Kuiken; Filippa Lentzos; Ruth Mampuys; Myriam Merad; Tatyana Novossiolova; Kenneth Oye; Edward Perkins; Natàlia Garcia-Reyero; Catherine Rhodes; Igor Linkov

doi:10.15252/msb.20209723

Building biosecurity for synthetic biology

Benjamin D. Trump, S. E. Galaitsi, Evan Appleton, Diederik A. Bleijs, Marie Valentine Florin, Jimmy D. Gollihar, R. Alexander Hamilton, Todd Kuiken, Filippa Lentzos, Ruth Mampuys, Myriam Merad, Tatyana Novossiolova, Kenneth Oye, Edward Perkins, Natàlia Garcia-Reyero, Catherine Rhodes, Igor Linkov

Research output: Contribution to journal › Comment/debate › peer-review

25 Scopus citations

Abstract

The fast-paced field of synthetic biology is fundamentally changing the global biosecurity framework. Current biosecurity regulations and strategies are based on previous governance paradigms for pathogen-oriented security, recombinant DNA research, and broader concerns related to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Many scholarly discussions and biosecurity practitioners are therefore concerned that synthetic biology outpaces established biosafety and biosecurity measures to prevent deliberate and malicious or inadvertent and accidental misuse of synthetic biology's processes or products. This commentary proposes three strategies to improve biosecurity: Security must be treated as an investment in the future applicability of the technology; social scientists and policy makers should be engaged early in technology development and forecasting; and coordination among global stakeholders is necessary to ensure acceptable levels of risk.

Original language	English (US)
Article number	e9723
Pages (from-to)	e9723
Journal	Molecular Systems Biology
Volume	16
Issue number	7
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.15252/msb.20209723
State	Published - Jul 1 2020

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
Immunology and Microbiology(all)
Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)
Applied Mathematics

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Trump, B. D., Galaitsi, S. E., Appleton, E., Bleijs, D. A., Florin, M. V., Gollihar, J. D., Hamilton, R. A., Kuiken, T., Lentzos, F., Mampuys, R., Merad, M., Novossiolova, T., Oye, K., Perkins, E., Garcia-Reyero, N., Rhodes, C., & Linkov, I. (2020). Building biosecurity for synthetic biology. Molecular Systems Biology, 16(7), e9723. Article e9723. https://doi.org/10.15252/msb.20209723

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title = "Building biosecurity for synthetic biology",

abstract = "The fast-paced field of synthetic biology is fundamentally changing the global biosecurity framework. Current biosecurity regulations and strategies are based on previous governance paradigms for pathogen-oriented security, recombinant DNA research, and broader concerns related to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Many scholarly discussions and biosecurity practitioners are therefore concerned that synthetic biology outpaces established biosafety and biosecurity measures to prevent deliberate and malicious or inadvertent and accidental misuse of synthetic biology's processes or products. This commentary proposes three strategies to improve biosecurity: Security must be treated as an investment in the future applicability of the technology; social scientists and policy makers should be engaged early in technology development and forecasting; and coordination among global stakeholders is necessary to ensure acceptable levels of risk.",

author = "Trump, {Benjamin D.} and Galaitsi, {S. E.} and Evan Appleton and Bleijs, {Diederik A.} and Florin, {Marie Valentine} and Gollihar, {Jimmy D.} and Hamilton, {R. Alexander} and Todd Kuiken and Filippa Lentzos and Ruth Mampuys and Myriam Merad and Tatyana Novossiolova and Kenneth Oye and Edward Perkins and Nat{\`a}lia Garcia-Reyero and Catherine Rhodes and Igor Linkov",

note = "Funding Information: The authors are grateful for the participation and support of attendees to the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme Advanced Research Workshop (G5489) in July 2019. Additional acknowledgements are due to the International Risk Governance Center at {\'E}cole polytechnique f{\'e}d{\'e}rale de Lausanne, the US Office of Naval Research Global, and the US Army Engineer Research and Development Center. The authors and workshop organizers thank Patrick Rose for his support. The authors thank George Siharulidze for his assistance with figure development. The authors are grateful for the financial support of the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme (Advanced Research Workshop G5489). Funding Information: The authors are grateful for the participation and support of attendees to the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme Advanced Research Workshop (G5489) in July 2019. Additional acknowledgements are due to the International Risk Governance Center at {\'E}cole polytechnique f{\'e}d{\'e}rale de Lausanne, the US Office of Naval Research Global, and the US Army Engineer Research and Development Center. The authors and workshop organizers thank Patrick Rose for his support. The authors thank George Siharulidze for his assistance with figure development. The authors are grateful for the financial support of the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme (Advanced Research Workshop G5489). Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 The Authors. Published under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license",

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AU - Trump, Benjamin D.

AU - Galaitsi, S. E.

AU - Appleton, Evan

AU - Bleijs, Diederik A.

AU - Florin, Marie Valentine

AU - Gollihar, Jimmy D.

AU - Hamilton, R. Alexander

AU - Kuiken, Todd

AU - Lentzos, Filippa

AU - Mampuys, Ruth

AU - Merad, Myriam

AU - Novossiolova, Tatyana

AU - Oye, Kenneth

AU - Perkins, Edward

AU - Garcia-Reyero, Natàlia

AU - Rhodes, Catherine

AU - Linkov, Igor

N1 - Funding Information: The authors are grateful for the participation and support of attendees to the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme Advanced Research Workshop (G5489) in July 2019. Additional acknowledgements are due to the International Risk Governance Center at École polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne, the US Office of Naval Research Global, and the US Army Engineer Research and Development Center. The authors and workshop organizers thank Patrick Rose for his support. The authors thank George Siharulidze for his assistance with figure development. The authors are grateful for the financial support of the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme (Advanced Research Workshop G5489). Funding Information: The authors are grateful for the participation and support of attendees to the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme Advanced Research Workshop (G5489) in July 2019. Additional acknowledgements are due to the International Risk Governance Center at École polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne, the US Office of Naval Research Global, and the US Army Engineer Research and Development Center. The authors and workshop organizers thank Patrick Rose for his support. The authors thank George Siharulidze for his assistance with figure development. The authors are grateful for the financial support of the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme (Advanced Research Workshop G5489). Publisher Copyright: © 2020 The Authors. Published under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license

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N2 - The fast-paced field of synthetic biology is fundamentally changing the global biosecurity framework. Current biosecurity regulations and strategies are based on previous governance paradigms for pathogen-oriented security, recombinant DNA research, and broader concerns related to genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Many scholarly discussions and biosecurity practitioners are therefore concerned that synthetic biology outpaces established biosafety and biosecurity measures to prevent deliberate and malicious or inadvertent and accidental misuse of synthetic biology's processes or products. This commentary proposes three strategies to improve biosecurity: Security must be treated as an investment in the future applicability of the technology; social scientists and policy makers should be engaged early in technology development and forecasting; and coordination among global stakeholders is necessary to ensure acceptable levels of risk.

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Building biosecurity for synthetic biology

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